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Jurisdiction and
International Arena

Standing

in

the

William C. Holmes*
Author's Note: After this article was written, the Second
Circuit issued its decision in Kruman v. Christie'sInternationalPLC,
No. 01-7309, 2002 WL 398290 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002). The decision
agrees with the author's logic that the FTAIA did not add a new
"plaintiff's injury" requirement to the Sherman Act, and that the
nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury is more properly part of a
standing analysis under the Clayton Act and not part of the FTAIA
jurisdictional inquiry. References to the case have been added to the
footnotes.

I. Introduction
One of the more fascinating - and frustrating - aspects of

U.S. antitrust law is its tendency to look for complex ways of
answering simple questions. Like the best existential philosopher, we
revel in crafting arcane solutions to even the most straight-forward of
problems. This criticism seems particularly apropos of the strange
manner in which a series of recent federal court decisions have
approached the following issue: whether to allow a foreign plaintiff
to sue in a U.S. court under the Sherman Act for purely
extraterritorial conduct. Rather than address the issue as one of
standing, the courts have articulated an exceedingly intricate
jurisdictional analysis under the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act that few can hope to truly understand and that
arguably does harm to both the statutory language of the Act and its
legislative history.
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II. The Stakes Are Higher Than You Might Think
At first blush, it might seem that most of us here in the United
States have little, if anything, at stake in how the courts resolve issues
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and standing over foreign parties
involved in foreign transactions. While this may well be true over the
short-term, the longer-term stakes are actually much higher for U.S.
businesses and their legal advisors. The reason? Because
international antitrust is not remaining static and is continuing to
change in ways that could catch many by surprise. An especially
powerful example can be seen in draft regulations issued by the
European Commission ("Commission") on September 28, 2000,1
calling for a major overhaul of the current system for enforcing
Articles 81 and 82 of the Rome Treaty. 2 Among other significant
changes, the regulations would replace the current system of
administrative enforcement by the Competition Commission with a
system of private judicial enforcement in the national courts. To this
end, the regulations would extend to national competition authorities
and courts the power to apply Community law in full. The intention
is to enable the Commission to focus its limited resources on the most
serious competitive restrictions and abuses, while leaving it to the
national courts to protect the rights of individual parties by awarding
damages and ruling on the enforceability of arguably anticompetitive
contracts and other transactions.
Imagine a business world in which the proposed European
regulations become final (a process currently in limbo, but still a
distinct possibility). United States businesses have become
accustomed to an environment in which their conduct abroad may
face the risk of foreign governmental action, but they have not had to
confront the high-stakes litigation poker we see here in our own
country. While the private litigation contemplated in the draft
European regulations would, presumably, not include the in terrorem
1 Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules of
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2000/0243 (CNS),
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition (last visited Mar. 1,
2002).
2 Articles 81 and 82 are roughly the European counterparts of our own
Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2. Copies of both provisions and of other key European
antitrust guides and rules can be found in HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW SOURCEBOOK
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2002).
3 See the accompanying paper by Jonathan Sinclair, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REv. 547 (2002).
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rules of trebled damages and automatic attorney fees found in our
system, it would still create a brave new world of private damages
litigation abroad - a brave new world in which the treatment of
standing and jurisdictional rules would take on a whole new meaning
for U.S. businesses and those advising them. Given this exposure,
those of us here in the United States do, most definitely, have a stake
in how the courts resolve issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
standing under our own Sherman Act, 4 for as the saying goes, "sauce
for the goose is sauce for the gander."

Il. Den Norske: A Case in Point
Taken literally, the antitrust laws of the United States extend
the same sweeping coverage to the nation's foreign commerce that
applies to its domestic commerce. However, our courts have not
taken a literal approach. Instead, they have long attempted to
articulate standards for foreign commerce that stop short of the
extremely far-reaching jurisdictional tests employed when dealing
with domestic commerce. 5 Congress weighed into the matter in 1982
with the enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(the "FTAIA").6 Statutory standards were enacted for asserting U.S.
antitrust jurisdiction over conduct involving trade with foreign
nations. These statutory prerequisites are now codified in Section 7a
4 European antitrust decisions not infrequently look to U.S. case law for

guidance, due to the enormous body of antitrust jurisprudence that has evolved here
over the past century.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d
Cir. 1945) (asking whether the challenged foreign conduct was "intended" to affect
American foreign commerce and, if so, actually had such an "effect"); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (employing a threepart balancing test that asked, first, whether the challenged foreign conduct affected
or was intended to affect U.S. foreign commerce; second, whether the restraint was
of sufficient magnitude to present a cognizable injury to American foreign
commerce; and third, whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be declined as a
matter of international comity). See also Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, No. 017309, 2002 WL 398290, at *5-*6 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002) (discussing Alcoa as
modified in Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981)).
6 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (Sherman Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (FTC
Act). See also U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for InternationalOperations, Sec. 3.14 (Apr. 1995) ("The
Agencies would apply the same principles regarding their foreign commerce
jurisdiction to Clayton Act Section 7 cases as they would apply in Sherman Act
cases."). See generally HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK, § 9:4 (2002).
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of the Sherman Act and Section 45(a)(2) of the FTC Act. In the
words of Section 6a:
[This Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce)
with foreign nations unless (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect --

(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or
commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or
commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
this Act, other than this section.
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the
operation of paragraph (1)(B), then [this Act] shall apply to
such conduct only for injury to export business in the
United States.7
Like moths drawn to a flame, U.S. courts have looked to this
extraordinarily convoluted language to answer the question of when a
foreign plaintiff can sue for alleged violations of the Sherman Act
occurring abroad. The result is some misplaced jurisprudence that
might have been handled much more sensibly under accepted
principles of antitrust standing. A case on point is the Fifth Circuit
8
decision in Den Norske Stats Qijeselskap AS v. Heeremac V. O.F.
Den Norske involved a Sherman Act challenge to an alleged
international conspiracy to raise prices for heavy-lift oil platform
services. 9 The plaintiff, Statoil, was a Norwegian oil company that
claimed it was injured when it had to pay an artificially high price for
services purchased in the North Sea. According to the complaint,
U.S. service purchasers were injured as well, in that they, too, paid
7
8

15 U.S.C. § 6a (2001) (emphasis added).
241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).

9 Id. at 422.
10 Id.
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artificially inflated prices for oil platform services purchased in U.S.
domestic waters in the Gulf of Mexico." Despite this allegation, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claim.' 2 In coming to this conclusion, the court focused on
the language in Section 2 of the FTAIA in which it is specified that
the "effect" that satisfies the "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable" prong of Section 1 of the Act must be what "gives rise
to a claim" under the Sherman Act (see highlighted language above).
From this, the court reasoned:
Based on the language of Section 2 of the FTAIA, the
effect on United States commerce-in this case, the higher
prices paid by United States companies for heavy-lift
services in the Gulf of Mexico-must give rise to the claim
that Statoil asserts against the defendants. That is, Statoil's
injury must stem from the effect of higher prices for heavylift services in the Gulf. We find no evidence that this
requirement is met here. 13
Rightly or wrongly, the court's reasoning is based on a logical
leap that is by no means dictated by the quoted language in Section 2.
The quoted language says simply that "such effect" - i.e., the "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce
needed to satisfy Section 1 of the FTAIA - must "give[] rise to a
claim" under the Sherman Act. Purchasers of platform services in
U.S. domestic waters would have had "a claim" under the Sherman
Act, even if Statoil did not. Thus, the question effectively begged by
the Court was whether the statutory reference to "a claim" really
means just the claim of the particular plaintiff, or refers more
generically to demonstrating an injury to a U.S. domestic or export
interest sufficient for a U.S. court to have subject matter jurisdiction.
Once one court goes down a path, others tend to follow, and
that is what seems to have happened to the arcane issue of FTAIA
jurisdiction. A growing number of other cases have now come to the
same conclusion that a foreign plaintiff alleging injury in a foreign
market must show that its specific injury "arose out of' the same
conduct used to satisfy the "direct, substantial and reasonably

11Id.
12

Id.

'3

Id. at 427.
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foreseeable effect" prong of FTAIA jurisdiction.1 4 Was this truly
what Congress intended? Arguably not. As tellingly observed by the
dissent in Den Norske, "[i]f the drafters of the FTAIA had wished
' 5 to
say 'the claim' instead of 'a claim,' they certainly would have."'
Indeed, what limited legislative history there is suggests that
the jurisdictional concern that Congress sought to address was not
with the specific injury to the particular plaintiff (the Den Norske
focus), but with the more general impact of the challenged conduct
on U.S. domestic or export trade. Thus, the House Report that
accompanied the Act gives the following example of something that
would qualify as having the requisite "direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable" effect for FTAIA jurisdiction:
[I]f a domestic export cartel were so strong as to have a
"spillover" effect on commerce within this country-by
creating a world-wide shortage or artificially inflated
world-wide price that had the effect of raising domestic
prices-the cartel's conduct would fall within the reach of
our antitrust laws. Such an impact would, at least over time,
meet the test of a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect
on domestic commerce. 16

14 See, e.g., Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d
620, 625 (S.D.
N.Y. 2001) (holding that "the FTAIA permits suit.. only where the conduct
complained of had 'direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable' effects in the
United States and the effects giving rise to jurisdiction are the basis for the alleged
injury."), rev'd, No. 01-7309, 2002 WL 398290 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002) (As noted
above, the district court was recently reversed by the Second Circuit in a ruling that
- like the author - rejects the notion that the "effect" giving rise to Sherman Act
jurisdiction under the FrAIA must also be the basis for the plaintiff's specific
injury. As expressed by the court: "The text of the FTAIA clearly reveals that its
focus is not on the plaintiffs injury but on the defendant's conduct, which is
regulated by the Sherman Act. The FTAIA does not regulate which plaintiffs can
bring suit under the Clayton Act, and it would be inappropriate to import the
element of injury from the Clayton Act and graft it onto the FTAIA." Id at *10.); In
re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that
under the FTAIA, "foreign consumers who have not participated in any way in the
U.S. market have no right to institute a Sherman Act claim."); In re Copper
Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (holding that "a
private plaintiff cannot sue under the antitrust laws of the United States for injuries
incurred as a result of international transactions that have an anticompetitive effect
on a United States market if the domestic anticompetitive effect is not the same one
that gives rise to the plaintiffs injury.").
'5 241 F.3d at 432 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
16 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
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Similarly, also in the House Report is the following statement
as to the intended impact of the Act:
[The Act] does not exclude all persons injured abroad from
recovering under the antitrust laws of the United States. A
course of conduct in the United States-e.g., price fixing
not limited to the export market-would affect all
purchasers of the target domestic products or services,
whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic. The conduct
has the requisite effects in the United States, even if some
purchasers take title abroad or suffer economic injury

abroad. 17
As suggested by these quotes, Congress seems to have been
concerned with the broader policy issue of whether the government's
interest in the challenged conduct is so "remote, minor, tangential or
otherwise insignificant" that the government "presumably would not
seek to control it." 18 Through the FTAIA, Congress - albeit rather
inartfully - set about articulating standardized, objective criteria for
separating out situations in which the effects of foreign conduct are
so removed from any legitimate U.S. domestic or foreign commerce
interest that jurisdiction should be denied.
That this is what was intended finds further support in the fact
that the House Report goes on to specifically approve of Pfizer, Inc.
v. Government of India,19 a case in which a foreign government was
held to have standing to sue an international cartel for allegedly
raising the price of drugs sold in foreign and domestic markets. 20 In
holding that foreign governments could sue for damages, the
Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]reble damage suits by foreigners
who have been victimized by antitrust violations clearly may
contribute to the protection of American consumers," where "an
exclusion of all foreign plaintiffs would lessen the deterrent effect of
treble damages." 2 1 Since Congress felt compelled to mention Pfizer
2498.
17

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2495.

18 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &

HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST

ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,

LAW: AN

272f (2d ed.

2000).
19Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978).
20 See 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2495.
21

Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314-15. In Kruman, the Second Circuit similarly notes

that the House Judiciary Committee Report "specifically and approvingly
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specifically, it seems more logical - at least to this author - that the

purpose of the FTAIA was not to block suits by injured foreign
plaintiffs challenging conduct that injures American consumers.
Rather, through the FTAIA, Congress sought to avoid situations in
which the U.S. commercial stake in the challenged conduct is so
tangential or non-existent that regulating it simply makes no sense.

IV. Standing: A More Logical Means to the Same End
The foregoing criticisms of Den Norske are not meant to
suggest that the outcome was wrong, but simply that the wrong
analytical tools were used to get there. Instead of looking to the
convoluted language of the FTAIA for a solution, the court might
have looked, instead, to well established principles of antitrust
standing to still conclude that the nature of the plaintiff's claimed
injury was such that it lacked standing to sue for either damages or
injunctive relief. Such an approach would have resolved the issue
before the court without having to arguably do violence to the
language and legislative history of the FTAIA.
Specifically, even if a practice violates the U.S. antitrust laws,
it does not follow that literally any party has the legal capacity to
initiate an antitrust challenge to the practice. Rather, the courts have
imposed significant standing limitations upon those persons and
entities having the ability to sue for antitrust relief. One such
limitation is that the injury incurred by the plaintiff must be "injury of
the type the- antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes the defendant's acts unlawful., 22 In addition,
although a showing of "antitrust injury" is necessary, it is "not always
sufficient[] to establish standing,.. because a party may have
suffered antitrust injury but may not be a proper plaintiff... for other
reasons. ' 23 Other potentially relevant considerations bearing on a
plaintiff's standing to sue for antitrust relief include the proximity
("remoteness") of the causal connection between the defendant's
antitrust violation and the plaintiff's harm, evidence of an actual
intent to cause that harm, whether there are more direct victims, the
speculativeness of the plaintiff's claimed injury, and the potential for
references" NationalBank of Canada as still alive and well following enactment of
the FTAIA. See Kruman, 2002 WL 398290, at *12.

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). See
also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (extending the
"antitrust injury" requirement of Brunswick to suits for injunctive relief).
22

23

Cargill,479 U.S. at 110 n.5.
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duplicative recovery or overly complex apportionment of damages. 24
Applying these principles, courts have denied standing to plaintiffs
whose injuries are incurred in markets unrelated to any legitimate
U.S. commercial interest, or whose injuries are so removed from that
which makes the defendant's conduct illegal under U.S. law as to
make them inappropriate parties with standing to challenge the
conduct.25
It takes no great leap to extend the logic of these cases to a
scenario such as that in Den Norske. When the plaintiff had to pay a
higher price for oil platform services it purchased in the North Sea
from foreign suppliers, did it incur injury "of [al type the [United
States] antitrust laws were intended to prevent"? 26 Doubtful, given
the lack of any nexus between the situs of the plaintiff's injury and
the territorial reach of U.S. law. Moreover, did this injury "flow[]
from that which ma[de] the defendant's acts unlawful" under U.S.
antitrust law? 27 Certainly not, unless the Sherman Act is viewed as an
international law of conduct, which it is not. Finally, was the nature
of the plaintiff's injury so removed from the conduct actually illegal
under the Sherman Act as to make the plaintiff an inappropriate party
24

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538-44 (1983) [hereinafter AGC]; Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982). See generally HOLMES, supra note 6, §§ 9:6
to 9:9.
25 See, e.g., Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
249 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (costs incurred by union health plans and
three foreign governments to treat smoking victims were too "remote, contingent,
derivative, and indirect" to give them standing, even if the plaintiffs were correct
that they were the "best" potential plaintiffs to challenge the defendant's allegedly
anticompetitive behavior); Ass'n of Wash. Public Hosp. Districts v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 241 F.3d 696, 704-05 (9th Cir. 2001) (public hospital districts lacked both
general and antitrust injury standing to sue tobacco companies for costs incurred in
having to treat smoking victims. The derivative, indirect and speculative nature of
their claimed injuries defeated standing under the AGC analysis, while their
involvement in the "health care market" rather than the tobacco market in which
the challenged conduct occurred, meant that they could not satisfy the Ninth
Circuit's "market participant" test of Brunswick antitrust injury); Allegheny Gen.
Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2000) (private hospitals
lacked standing to pursue antitrust claims against tobacco manufacturers, even
though several of the AGC factors - intent, antitrust injury, and a causal connection
- appeared to favor standing, where the favorable factors were "overwhelm[ed]" by
the "remoteness" of the plaintiff's claimed injuries from the conduct by defendants
that allegedly violated U.S. antitrust law).
26 Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.
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with standing to challenge the conduct? Certainly yes, for the same
reason persons who incur merely "derivative" injury not infrequently
lack standing even when they are U.S. citizens. In short, a standing
analysis would have been a far more logical, and equally effective,
means of addressing the dilemma facing the court in Den Norske,
without having to step into the murky waters of the FIAIA and do
mischief
to what Congress seems to have truly intended with that
28

Act.

See Kruman, 2002 WL 398290, at *9 (holding that allegations that the
defendants had conspired to fix prices in foreign auction markets, as an essential
part of a scheme to also fix domestic auction prices, satisfied the FIAIA test for
subject matter jurisdiction, and that arguments involving the nature of the
plaintiffs specific injury "conflate[d] the FTAIA with the Clayton Act, which is
the statute that determines whether a plaintiff may bring a private cause of action
for a violation of the antitrust laws based on its actual or threatened injury."); see
also Galavan Supplements, Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 1997 WL 732498,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1997) (holding that the claim of a foreign plaintiff
satisfied the FTAIA test for subject matter jurisdiction, but that the plaintiff lacked
standing under the AGC analysis), cited with approval in In re Microsoft, 127 F.
Supp. 2d at 716 ("I am inclined to believe that the court in Galavan was correct in
placing its holding on standing grounds."). Cf Hartford Fire Ins. v. Cal., 509 U.S.
764, 796 (1993) ("[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States.").
28

